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Preface to the Second Edition 
——————————
This text considers legal aspects of a broad range of instruments that
governments have used for fighting terrorism, including criminal penalties,
economic sanctions, immigration restrictions, military force, and civil liability.
It addresses not just the steps taken in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, but also to
many other counter-terrorism measures by the United States and other nations
in recent years. To offer a global and comparative perspective, the materials
include cases from foreign countries and international tribunals.
The Second Edition addresses many new legal developments that have
occurred since publication of the original edition in May 2005, including new
Supreme Court decisions and federal legislation.  It includes more than 15 new
cases, covers new federal laws including the Military Commission Act of 2006
and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and has new explanatory text and
notes. The edition incorporates most of the materials from the 2006-2009
supplements.
This book originally grew out of a set of readings that I prepared for the
George Washington/Oxford University Program in International Human
Rights during the summer of 2004.  I am very grateful to the Program Direc-
tors, Professors Ralph Steinhardt and Andrew Shacknove, for inviting me to
participate.  I benefitted greatly from the comments of the students and the
other faculty members participating in the program.  In addition, Professor
Jose Carillo generously invited me to participate in his Human Rights Clinic
at the George Washington University Law School, where I had the opportunity
to discuss issues related to this book and to meet students and attorneys
involved in defending persons accused of offenses related to terrorism.
As an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
I have worked on several terrorism-related policies and cases.  Most signifi-
cantly, I assisted a team involved in drafting the rules for trials by military
commissions and I also have advised the military commissions prosecution
team on various issues.  The other military attorneys with whom I have
worked have educated me on many subjects addressed in these materials and
tremendously increased my interest in them.  But the views stated in this book
are my own, and do not represent the official views of the U.S. Department
of Defense or Department of the Army.
I am extremely grateful to Professor Ronald Rotunda for his advice and
assistance throughout the entire process of developing this book.  (In fact, I
have attempted to replicate here the format of his very successful Modern
PREFACEiv
Constitutional Law casebook).  I am also thankful to Professors Bradford
Clark, Jerome Barron, Mary Cheh, Geoff Corn, Peter Raven-Hansen, Jonathan
Turley, and John Yoo for sharing their ideas on the subject of terrorism with
me.  My father, Professor Peter B. Maggs, helped me with this project in many
ways, especially by translating excerpts from a decision of the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation regarding the use of force in the Chechen
Republic (included at 205 below).  Colonel Mark Harvey, U.S. Army retired,
a former judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals and Clerk of
Court for the U.S. Military Commissions, gave me accurate and useful guid-
ance on many military law issues.  My research assistant Emily Lerner also
made many valuable contributions.  All errors are my fault.
Please note that in editing the cases and other materials excerpted in this
book, I have indicated omitted paragraphs by three asterisks (“* * *”) and
omitted sentences or portions of sentences by ellipses (“. . .”).  I have placed
in brackets (“[ ]”) any text that I have added when editing quoted materials.
I have omitted footnotes without indication, but have retained the original
numbering of the footnotes that remain.  Please consult the actual sources
when conducting further research.
GREGORY E. MAGGS
Washington, D.C.
October 2009
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1Chapter 1
TERRORISM AND THE
 CRIMINAL LAW
1-1. INTRODUCTION
What is terrorism and how does it concern the law?
The term “terrorism” has no settled meaning.  In fact, one scholar has coun-
ted twenty-two different definitions of terrorism in federal law alone.  See
Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Definitions of Terrorism: The
Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. Legis. 249 (2004).  In United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the difficulties of defining terrorism and explained
various approaches that domestic and international law have used.  The court
said:
Confusion on the definition of “terrorism” abounds.  See, e.g., Craig
S. Smith, Debate Over Iraq Raises Fears of a Shrinking Role for NATO,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2003, at L26 (quoting Celeste A. Wallander, senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as stating that
even among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (“NATO”)
there is no consensus “on how to define transnational terrorism”).
Terrorism is defined variously by the perpetrators’ motives, methods,
targets, and victims.  Motive-based definitions suffer from confusion
because of the attempt to carve out an exception for assertedly legitimate
armed struggle in pursuit of self-determination.  For example, under one
of the various United Nations resolutions addressing terrorism, armed and
violent acts do not constitute “terrorism” if committed by peoples seeking
self-determination in opposition to a violently enforced occupation.  See,
e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations Among Co-operating States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292
(1970). This attempt to distinguish “terrorists” from “freedom fighters”
potentially could legitimate as non-terrorist certain groups nearly univer-
sally recognized as terrorist, including the Irish Republican Army, Hezbol-
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lah, and Hamas.  See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found.
for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing Hamas);
Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 89 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1996) (de-
scribing Hezbollah);  Matter of Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F.
Supp. 1137, 1139-40 (N.D.Cal. 1994) (describing the Irish Republican
Army). 
By contrast, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
defines terrorism solely based on the methods of violence the perpetrator
employs, and explicitly removes political judgment of the acts by defining
most violent acts as “non-political” (regardless of the perpetrator’s claimed
motive).  European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10,
1976, Europ.  T.S. No. 90.  Thus, in Article I, the Convention defines as
terrorism any offenses, inter alia, “involving the use of a bomb, grenade,
rocket, automatic firearm, or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers
persons,” a definition that may fail to circumscribe the offense adequately.
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Cairo, Apr. 22,
1998), reprinted in International Instruments Related to the Prevention and
Suppression of International Terrorism, 152-73 (United Nations 2001),
while condemning terrorism, takes a uniquely restrictive approach to
defining it, stating that offenses committed against the interests of Arab
states are “terrorist offenses,” while offenses committed elsewhere or
against other peoples or interests are not.  Id. at Art. I.3 (defining “terrorist
offence” as any of several defined violent actions that occur “in any of the
Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests”).  The
Convention further defines as legitimate (non-terrorist) “[a]ll cases of
struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle,” unless such
struggles “prejudic[e] the territorial integrity of any Arab State.”  Id. at Art.
II(a).
United States legislation has adopted several approaches to defining
terrorism, demonstrating that, even within nations, no single definition of
“terrorism” or “terrorist act” prevails.  There are numerous statutes defin-
ing “terrorism” or “acts of terrorism.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (defining
terrorism by motive, stating that “international terrorism” is comprised of
certain acts that “appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population;  (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion;  or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination or kidnapping”);  50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (substantially
the same);  6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(B) (defining terrorism by its effect on United
States interests, stating that “acts of terrorism” are any acts that are “unlaw-
ful” and that cause damage to any “person, property, or entity” in the
United States, or to any United States-flag craft or air carrier);  8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (in the context of what acts cause an alien to be exclud-
able based on participation in “terrorist activity,” defining “terrorist activ-
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ity” apart from any nexus to United States interests, as “any activity which
is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which,
if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State)” and that involves, inter alia, attacks on third
parties to influence the policy of any government, attacks on aircraft and
other vessels, or the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons). 
Still other definitions of “terrorism” may focus on the victims of the
attacks or the relationship between the perpetrators and the victims.  See,
e.g., Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism 1-2 (1988)
(“Terrorism is a method of combat in which . . . symbolic victims serve as
an instrumental target of violence.  These instrumental victims share group
or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victim-
ization.  Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence
other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear
(terror).”)
Id. at 107 n. 42.  (More of the decision in United States v. Yousef is reprinted
on page 33 below.)
But even without a precise definition, some general agreement exists.  For
instance, few would dispute that the term “terrorism” accurately describes the
attacks of September 11, 2001, the 1998 bombing of the United States’
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 1994 Oklahoma City Bombing, the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Centers, and many other notorious inci-
dents discussed in these materials.  In addition, most examples of terrorism
appear to have something important in common.  Whether by taking hostages,
hijacking aircraft, detonating bombs, assassinating political leaders, murdering
civilians, or sabotaging buildings and equipment, terrorists generally seek to
achieve some kind of political end.  By inflicting pain and by threatening
future harm, terrorists hope to influence others to do whatever it is that they
want.
Terrorism concerns the law in several ways.  First, the law obviously
prohibits terrorist acts of various kinds, like murder, hijacking, and destruction
of property.  Second, and sometimes more controversially, the law limits and
regulates governmental responses to terrorism.  The law for example, specifies
requirements for fair trials, it constrains methods of investigation, and it may
prohibit certain forms of military action against suspected terrorists.  Third,
the law may impose civil liability on terrorists, those who support terrorists,
those who fail to provide protection against terrorists, and others.
This book addresses a variety of  subjects.  Part I, which consists of
chapters 1 through 4, concerns the use of the criminal justice system to counter
terrorism.  Part II, which consists of chapters 5 and 6, considers two civil
responses to terrorism, immigration controls and sanctions.  Part III, which
includes chapters 7 through 11, addresses the authority to use military force
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against terrorists.  Part IV, which includes chapters 12 through 14, treats the
subjects of military detention and interrogation of terrorists.  Part V, which
includes chapters 15 through 19, covers the military trial and punishment of
terrorists.  And Part VI, which includes chapters 20 and 21, concludes by
discussing possible bases for compensating victims of terrorism and victims
of military and other responses to terrorism.
Notes
1. One provision of the U.S. Code defines terrorism simply as “premedi-
tated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2).  How
inclusive is this general definition?  Can a terrorist have a pecuniary motive
instead of a political motive?  Are all terrorists members of groups or agents
of someone else?  Can nations commit terrorism?  Are the victims of terrorism
always non-combatants?  The following notes provide illustrations that raise
these kinds of questions.
2. The Unabomber Case.  From 1978 to 1995, a former Berkeley mathe-
matics professor named Theodore John Kaczynski mailed packages containing
bombs to scientists and business executives.  In total, the explosives killed 3
people and injured 29 others.  While his identity was still unknown, the FBI
code-named its investigation “UNABOM.”  Based on this code-name, the
media began calling the perpetrator of the attacks the “Unabomber.”  Kaczyn-
ski had carried out the bombings to protest the development of technology.
In 1995, he announced that he would stop his attacks if a nationally circulated
newspaper or magazine would publish a 35,000-word manifesto explaining
his anti-technology views.  Several months later, the Washington Post printed
the document.  This publication ultimately led to Kaczynski’s capture.  The
manifesto cited a number of unusual books, and the FBI searched library
records to determine who had checked them out.  In addition, Kaczynski’s
brother recognized the manifesto as something similar to what Kaczynski
previously had written; he informed investigators and received a $1 million
reward.  The FBI found Kaczynski living alone in a primitive cabin in the
Montana woods.  To avoid the death penalty, Kaczynski entered an agreement
in which he pleaded guilty to thirteen counts of explosives charges, including
transporting, mailing, and using explosives in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 844(d), 924(c) & 1716.  He received a sentence of life in prison without
the possibility of parole.  United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1043 (2002).  Was Kaczynski, who acted alone,
a terrorist under the definition in note 1?
3. The D.C. Area Snipers.  In the fall of 2002, two men, John Allen
Muhammad and Lee Malvo, frightened the population of Washington, D.C.,
and surrounding areas. One of them fired shots from a hole in the trunk of
their car at unsuspecting members of the public, whom they apparently chose
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1. More information about Usama bin
Laden and al-Qaida appears in the excerpted
indictment in United States v. Bin Laden on
page 92 below.  Please note that the non-ex-
cerpted text and notes in this book spell the
name of the terrorist network as “al-Qaida.” I
have chosen this spelling because both the
United States federal government and the
United Nations tend to use it.  See, e.g.,U.S.
Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorists and Terror-
ist Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 75587-02
(Dec. 17, 2004) (Public Notice 4936); U.N.
Security Council Resolution No. 1526
(2004).  Various works, including many judi-
cial opinions, use other spellings, including
“al Qaeda” and similar variations.  See, e.g.,
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (using “al
Qaeda”).  Some sources capitalize the initial
“a” and some do not; and some include a hy-
phen after the “l” and some do not.
In Arabic, the name of the terrorist network
is , which means “the base.” 	
See Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Arabic
780 (1973).  Although pronunciations differ
throughout the Arabic speaking world, this
combination of a definite article and noun is
pronounced in modern standard Arabic as
 al qa  ida, a quadrisyllabic utterance in
which [] is a glottal stop, [q] is an unvoiced
uvular stop, [a  ] is a vowel of extended
length, and [ ] is a voiced pharyngeal frica-
tive.
at random. In total, the two men are suspected of killing 10 persons and
wounding 3 others.  Both have been convicted of serious offenses. Malvo has
been sentenced to life imprisonment and Muhammad has been sentenced to
death.  Malvo asserted at his sentencing that the two men were attempting “to
extort $10 million from the government in order to start a multiracial utopia
in the woods of Canada.”  But at Muhammad’s sentencing hearing, prosecu-
tors asserted that the goal was “to create a cover so that Muhammad could kill
his ex-wife and get his children back.”  Carol Morello, Victims’ Relatives Still
Ask, “Why?”; Snipers’ Motives Remain Unresolved, Wash. Post, Mar. 11,
2004, at A11.  Under either motive, would Malvo or Muhammad be consid-
ered terrorists under the definition in note 1?
4. The U.S.S. Cole Bombing.  On October 12, 2000, a United States Navy
vessel, the U.S.S. Cole, was refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen.  Two men
brought a rubber boat alongside the ship.  The boat contained explosives,
which the men detonated.  The explosion created a hole forty feet across in
the side of the ship.  The blast killed 17 crew members and wounded 40
others.  The United States suspects that Usama bin Ladin and agents of the
al-Qaida1 terrorist network orchestrated the attack.  See United States v. Goba,
240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).  Would this attack on military forces
qualify as an act of terrorism under the definition in note 1?
1-2. ORDINARY CRIMINAL LAWS APPLIED TO TERRORISTS
In many instances, the difficulties of defining terrorism may not matter.
Prosecutors often do not need to worry about the definition of terrorism or rely
on special anti-terrorism legislation when charging suspected terrorists.  On
the contrary, most acts of terrorism violate ordinary criminal laws of general
application.  For example, murder is murder, whether it is committed by a
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terrorist, a mobster, or an armed robber.  The same is true for assault, kidnap-
ing, arson, and many other offenses that terrorists might commit.
Yet a decision to charge and then try a suspected terrorist as though he or
she were just another criminal suspect raises important questions.  Is it irrele-
vant whether a person is a terrorist?  Is equality of treatment of suspected
terrorists and other suspected criminals necessary to preserve the fairness of
the trial for the accused?  Or does treating terrorism the same as other forms
of crime overlook important distinctions, some of which might benefit sus-
pected terrorists?
——————————
KASI v. VIRGINIA
Supreme Court of Virginia
508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998)
COMPTON, Justice.
On Monday, January 25, 1993, near 8:00 a.m., a number of automobiles
were stopped in two north-bound, left-turn lanes on Route 123 in Fairfax
County at the main entrance to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).  The vehicle operators had stopped for a red traffic light and
were waiting to turn into the entrance.
At the same time, a lone gunman emerged from another vehicle, which he
had stopped behind the automobiles.  The gunman, armed with an AK-47
assault rifle, proceeded to move among the automobiles firing the weapon into
them. Within a few seconds, Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett were killed
and Nicholas Starr, Calvin Morgan, and Stephen Williams were wounded by
the gunshots.  All the victims were CIA employees and were operators of
separate automobiles.  The gunman, later identified as defendant Mir Aimal
Kasi, also known as Mir Aimal Kansi, fled the scene.
At this time, defendant, a native of Pakistan, was residing in an apartment
in Reston with a friend, Zahed Mir.  Defendant was employed as a driver for
a local courier service and was familiar with the area surrounding the CIA
entrance.
The day after the shootings, defendant returned to Pakistan.  Two days
later, Mir reported to the police that defendant was a “missing person.”
On February 8, 1993, the police searched Mir’s apartment and discovered
the weapon used in the shootings as well as other property of defendant.
Defendant had purchased the weapon in Fairfax County three days prior to
commission of the crimes.
On February 16, 1993, defendant was indicted for the following offenses
arising from the events of January 25th:  Capital murder of Darling as part of
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the same act that killed Bennett, Code § 18.2-31(7);  murder of Bennett, Code
§ 8.2-32; malicious woundings of Starr, Morgan, and Williams, Code § 18.2-
51; and five charges of using a firearm in commission of the foregoing felo-
nies, Code § 18.2-53.1.
Nearly four and one-half years later, on June 15, 1997, agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apprehended defendant in a hotel room
in Pakistan.  Defendant had been travelling in Afghanistan during the entire
period, except for brief visits to Pakistan.
On June 17, 1997, defendant was flown from Pakistan to Fairfax County
in the custody of FBI agents.  During the flight, after signing a written rights
waiver form, defendant gave an oral and written confession of the crimes to
FBI agent Bradley J. Garrett.
Following 15 pretrial hearings, defendant was tried by a single jury during
ten days in November 1997 upon his plea of not guilty to the indictments.  The
jury found defendant guilty of all charges and, during the second phase of the
bifurcated capital proceeding, fixed defendant’s punishment at death based
upon the vileness predicate of the capital murder sentencing statute, Code
§ 19.2-264.4.
On February 4, 1998, after three post-trial hearings, during one of which
the trial court considered a probation officer’s report, the court sentenced
defendant to death for the capital murder.  Also, the court sentenced defendant
to the following punishment in accord with the jury’s verdict:  For the first-de-
gree murder of Bennett, life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine;  for each of
the malicious woundings, 20 years’ imprisonment and a $100,000 fine; and
for the firearms charges, two years in prison for one charge and four years in
prison for each of the remaining four charges.
* * *
[Kasi raised over 90 issues on appeal.  The Court’s discussion of all but
the following issues is omitted.]
Next, defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied permission for
defendant to contact a juror for questioning and to conduct an inquiry about
the jury’s deliberations.  The issue arose against the following background.
Prior to trial, the court denied permission for defendant to contact potential
jurors.  The names of the jurors were not made public by agreement of coun-
sel.  At the beginning of the penalty stage on November 11, the court entered
an order prohibiting the disclosure of “the name, address, identity or image”
of any juror after considering “the need to protect jurors, the absolute right
of jurors not to discuss the case, and protection of the confidentiality of juror
deliberations.”
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On November 20, six days after the jury’s sentencing verdict was rendered,
a newspaper published an article reporting information gleaned from an
interview with one juror about the penalty stage deliberations.  The article
quoted the juror as stating, for example, that some jurors “thought the crime
was vile because Kasi, an immigrant, ‘had attacked the American way of
life.’ ”  Also, the juror reportedly labeled defendant a “terrorist,” a term the
court had prohibited the participants from attaching to defendant during the
trial proceedings.
On January 6, 1998, defendant moved to set aside the sentencing verdict,
alleging juror misconduct on the basis of the article.  He also asked for permis-
sion to subpoena the juror for interrogation.  After a hearing, the trial court,
assuming the news article accurately reported the juror’s statements, denied
both motions.  The court ruled that the reported information “relates to the
mental impressions of the jury and the way that they deliberated and consid-
ered the evidence.”  Hence, according to the court, inquiry of the jury was not
allowed.  The trial court was correct.
Virginia has been more careful than most states to protect the inviolability
and secrecy of jury deliberations, adhering to the general rule that the testi-
mony of jurors should not be received to impeach their verdict, especially on
the ground of their own misconduct.  Jenkins, 244 Va. at 460, 423 S.E.2d at
370.  Generally, we have limited findings of prejudicial juror misconduct to
activities of jurors that occur outside the jury room.  Id. Here, the alleged
misconduct clearly occurred within the confines of the jury room, and a post-
trial investigation into the allegations was unwarranted.
Finally, defendant contends the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, and that the death
sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases.  While not directly addressing those issues, defendant asks the Court
to “commute this death sentence to life in prison without parole.”
The defendant bases his plea for commutation on an argument laced with
hyperbole, and threats inappropriate in an appellate brief.  He reaches conclu-
sions having absolutely no foundation in this record.  For example, he says
the death sentence resulted from the “open hostility” of the trial judge and
because the prosecutors “were diligent in maligning the defense team repeat-
edly in the media.”  The record shows otherwise.  The trial court in all the
proceedings was thorough, even-handed, and considerate of all counsel, and
presided in a manner that was fair both to the Commonwealth and the defen-
dant.  The Commonwealth’s Attorney was diligent, well-prepared, and did not
exceed the bounds of conduct expected of an aggressive prosecutor.
The defendant says that because his crimes were “political,” he somehow
is entitled to First Amendment protection, and that his death sentence should
be commuted to avoid possible violent acts of reprisal.  As the Attorney
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General observes, defendant received the death sentence, not because he had
a political motive, but because he murdered two innocent men, and maimed
three others, in an extremely brutal and premeditated manner.  As the defen-
dant moved among the stopped automobiles, he shot through the rear window
of the Darling vehicle, severely wounding Darling in the torso.  In a few
seconds, defendant appeared at the front of the Darling vehicle and fired at
him again, destroying a part of his head.  Darling also suffered at least one
gunshot wound to his lower leg, resulting in a compound fracture.  There is
nothing “arbitrary” about a death sentence imposed under the circumstances
of this case and, thus, there is no basis for commutation.
* * *
Consequently, we hold the trial court committed no reversible error, and
we have independently determined from a review of the entire record that the
sentence of death was properly assessed.  Thus, we will affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
——————————
Notes
1. Kasi was concerned about two problems.  One is that a juror may have
labeled him as a terrorist.  Another is that the court did not take his political
motivations into account as a mitigating factor in determining his sentence.
Why might Kasi have thought he was prejudiced?  Are these concerns some-
what inconsistent? 
2. Consider again the federal statute that defines terrorism as “politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents.”  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2).  Under this definition,
would Kasi be a terrorist?  Was he charged with being a terrorist?  Note that
upon his capture, Kasi reportedly said that “he shot five people outside CIA
headquarters in 1993 to protest U.S. policies toward Muslims in the Middle
East, including the bombing of Iraq.”  Wendy Melillo & Brooke A. Master,
Kasi Shot Five Near CIA to Protest U.S. Policy, Prosecutor Says, Wash. Post,
Nov. 6, 1997, at B1.
1-3.  LAWS AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT TERRORISM
Although ordinary criminal laws of general application already prohibit
many of the kinds of acts that terrorists commit, Congress has enacted signifi-
cant criminal legislation specifically aimed at terrorism.  The U.S. Criminal
Code, in fact, now contains an entire chapter addressing the subject.  See 18
U.S.C., pt. I, ch. 113B.  Several of the provisions of this chapter are reprinted
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1. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines pro-
vide for an enhancement “[i]f the offense is
. . . a federal crime of terrorism.”  U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.4.  (This provision is addressed in
United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2003), reprinted on page 119 below).  A “fed-
eral offense of terrorism” is any one of certain
listed federal offenses if committed “to influ-
ence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(g)(5).
in the Appendix A on page 690 below, and several cases in this book discuss
them.
How do these laws aimed specifically at terrorism differ from ordinary
criminal laws?  The short answer is that they do not differ very much.  Most
of the federal legislation concerning terrorism does not actually apply just to
terrorists.  Instead, the legislation applies to everyone who commits the
specific acts that it prohibits.  For example, the offense of “Terrorist Acts
Abroad Against United States Nationals”  can be committed by anyone who
kills, kidnaps, or assaults a person within the United States as part of “conduct
transcending national boundaries” provided certain jurisdictional requirements
are met.  18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1).  The prosecution does not have to prove
a terrorist motive or an affiliation with a terrorist organization.  Instead, it only
has to prove that the defendant committed one of the offenses that the law
prohibits.  It just so happens that international terrorists are most likely to
commit these kinds of offenses.
Very few federal laws require the federal government to prove that anyone
is a “terrorist” or has a connection to a “terrorist organization.”1  But one
important exception is the frequently charged offense of “Providing Material
Support to Designated Terrorist Organizations” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B.  Section 2339B says:
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and,
if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years
or for life.
Id. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added).
What is a “terrorist organization” for the purposes of § 2339B?  This is not
an open-ended question.  Instead, the Act defines a terrorist organization as
“an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.”  Id. § 2339B(g)(6).  Section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Secretary of State to designate
a group as a “foreign terrorist organization” if the group meets the following
criteria:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section
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2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (defining
“terrorist activity” to include highjacking,
hostage taking, using biological, chemical, or
nuclear devices, etc.); 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2)
(defining “terrorism” as “premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups
or clandestine agents”).
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2)
of Title 22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist
activity or terrorism); and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United
States.
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4).2
Pursuant to this law, the Secretary of State routinely designates groups as
terrorist organizations.  The list varies over time, but it has included the
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization, HAMAS (Islamic Resis-
tance Movement), Hizballah (Party of God), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), al-Qaida, the Real IRA, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), and the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), and others.  See U.S.
Dep’t of State, Alphabetical Listing of Blocked Persons, Blocked Vessels,
Specially Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Specially
Designated Global Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Specially
Designated Narcotics, 74 Fed. Reg. 29742-01 (Jun. 23, 2009).  The following
case interprets the statute and addresses its constitutionality.
——————————
UNITED STATES v. HAMMOUD
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
WILLIAM W. WILKINS, Chief Judge.
Mohammed Hammoud appeals the sentence imposed following his convic-
tions of numerous offenses, all of which are connected to his support of
Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO).  Hammoud also
challenges two of his 14 convictions. . . .
I. Facts
The facts underlying Hammoud’s convictions and sentence are largely
undisputed.  We therefore recount them briefly.
 A. Hizballah
Hizballah is an organization founded by Lebanese Shi’a Muslims in
response to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel.  Hizballah provides
various forms of humanitarian aid to Shi’a Muslims in Lebanon.  However,
it is also a strong opponent of Western presence in the Middle East, and it
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advocates the use of terrorism in support of its agenda.  Hizballah is particu-
larly opposed to the existence of Israel and to the activities of the American
government in the Middle East. Hizballah’s general secretary is Hassan
Nasserallah, and its spiritual leader is Sheikh Fadlallah.
 B. Hammoud
In 1992, Hammoud, a citizen of Lebanon, attempted to enter the United
States on fraudulent documents.  After being detained by the INS, Hammoud
sought asylum.  While the asylum application was pending, Hammoud moved
to Charlotte, North Carolina, where his brothers and cousins were living.
Hammoud ultimately obtained permanent resident status by marrying a United
States citizen.
At some point in the mid-1990s, Hammoud, his wife, one of his brothers,
and his cousins all became involved in a cigarette smuggling operation.  The
conspirators purchased large quantities of cigarettes in North Carolina,
smuggled them to Michigan, and sold them without paying Michigan taxes.
This scheme took advantage of the fact that Michigan imposes a tax of $7.50
per carton of cigarettes, while the North Carolina tax is only 50¢.  It is esti-
mated that the conspiracy involved a quantity of cigarettes valued at roughly
$7.5 million and that the state of Michigan was deprived of $3 million in tax
revenues.
In 1996, Hammoud began leading weekly prayer services for Shi’a Mus-
lims in Charlotte.  These services were often conducted at Hammoud’s home.
At these meetings, Hammoud—who is acquainted with both Nasserallah and
Fadlallah, as well as Sheikh Abbas Harake, a senior military commander for
Hizballah—urged the attendees to donate money to Hizballah.  Hammoud
would then forward the money to Harake.  The Government’s evidence
demonstrated that on one occasion, Hammoud donated $3,500 of his own
money to Hizballah.
Based on these and other activities, Hammoud was charged with various
immigration violations, sale of contraband cigarettes, money laundering, mail
fraud, credit card fraud, and racketeering.  Additionally, Hammoud was
charged with conspiracy to provide material support to a designated FTO and
with providing material support to a designated FTO, both in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).  The latter § 2339B charge
related specifically to Hammoud’s personal donation of $3,500 to Hizballah.
At trial, one of the witnesses against Hammoud was Said Harb, who grew
up in the same Lebanese neighborhood as Hammoud.  Harb testified regarding
his own involvement in the cigarette smuggling operation and also provided
information regarding the provision of “dual use” equipment (such as global
positioning systems, which can be used for both civilian and military activi-
ties) to Hizballah.  The Government alleged that this conduct was part of the
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conspiracy to provide material support to Hizballah.  Harb testified that
Hammoud had declined to become involved in providing equipment because
he was helping Hizballah in his own way.  Harb also testified that when he
traveled to Lebanon in September 1999, Hammoud gave him $3,500 for
Hizballah.
 C. Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Hammoud of 14 offenses, . . . [including]:  money
laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering, see 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1956(a)(1), (h) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004);  transportation of contraband
cigarettes, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2342 (West 2000);  and providing material
support to a designated FTO, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B.
* * *
 II. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B
Section 2339B, which was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, provides for a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment for any
person who “knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so.”  18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2339B(a)(1).  The term “material support” is defined as “currency or other
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other
physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”  18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2339A(b) (West 2000).
Hammoud maintains that § 2339B is unconstitutional in a number of
respects.  Because Hammoud failed to bring these challenges before the
district court, our review is for plain error. . . .
    A. Freedom of Association
Hammoud first contends that § 2339B impermissibly restricts the First
Amendment right of association.  See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble . . . .”).  Hammoud concedes (at least for purposes of this argument)
that Hizballah engages in terrorist activity.  But, he also notes the undisputed
fact that Hizballah provides humanitarian aid to citizens of Lebanon.  Ham-
moud argues that because Hizballah engages in both legal and illegal activi-
ties, he can be found criminally liable for providing material support to Hiz-
ballah only if he had a specific intent to further the organization’s illegal aims.
Because § 2339B lacks such a specific intent requirement, Hammoud argues
that it unconstitutionally restricts the freedom of association. . . .
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3. Hammoud relies in part on cases
holding that a donation to a political
advocacy group is a proxy for speech.  See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1976) (per curiam).  Hizballah is not a
political advocacy group, however.
Therefore, while providing monetary support
to Hizballah may have an expressive
component, it is not the equivalent of pure
political speech.  See Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (9th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that material
support prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny
review under Buckley and similar cases).
It is well established that “[t]he First Amendment . . . restricts the ability
of the State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his associa-
tion with another.”  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19
(1982);  see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (noting that a
“blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal
aims . . . [would pose] a real danger that legitimate political expression or
association would be impaired”).  Therefore, it is a violation of the First
Amendment to punish an individual for mere membership in an organization
that has legal and illegal goals.  Any statute prohibiting association with such
an organization must require a showing that the defendant specifically in-
tended to further the organization’s unlawful goals.  See Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1966).  Hammoud maintains that because § 2339B does
not contain such a specific intent requirement, his conviction violates the First
Amendment.3
Hammoud’s argument fails because § 2339B does not prohibit mere
association;  it prohibits the conduct of providing material support to a desig-
nated FTO. Therefore, cases regarding mere association with an organization
do not control.  Rather, the governing standard is found in United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which applies when a facially neutral statute
restricts some expressive conduct.  Such a statute is valid 
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;  if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest;  if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;  and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
Id. at 377.
Section 2339B satisfies all four prongs of the O’Brien test.  First,  § 2339B
is clearly within the constitutional power of the government, in view of the
government’s authority to regulate interactions between citizens and foreign
entities.  See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244(1984) (holding that restric-
tions on travel to Cuba do not violate the Due Process Clause).  Second, there
can be no question that the government has a substantial interest in curbing
the spread of international terrorism.  See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,
205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).  Third, the Government’s interest in
curbing terrorism is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.  Ham-
moud is free to advocate in favor of Hizballah or its political objec-
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tives—§ 2339B does not target such advocacy.
Fourth and finally, the incidental effect on expression caused by § 2339B
is no greater than necessary.  In enacting § 2339B and its sister statute, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339A, Congress explicitly found that “foreign organizations that
engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”  AEDPA
§ 301(a)(7).  As the Ninth Circuit reasoned, 
[i]t follows that all material support given to [foreign terrorist] organiza-
tions aids their unlawful goals.  Indeed, . . . terrorist organizations do not
maintain open books.  Therefore, when someone makes a donation to them,
there is no way to tell how the donation is used.  Further, . . . even contri-
butions earmarked for peaceful purposes can be used to give aid to the
families of those killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making the
decision to engage in terrorism more attractive.  More fundamentally,
money is fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization’s peace-
ful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (footnote omitted).  In light of
this reasoning, the prohibition on material support is adequately tailored to
the interest served and does not suppress more speech than is necessary to
further the Government’s legitimate goal.  We therefore conclude that
§ 2339B does not infringe on the constitutionally protected right of free
association.
 B. Overbreadth
Hammoud next argues that § 2339B is overbroad.  A statute is overbroad
only if it “punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.
113, 118-19 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The overbreadth must
be substantial “not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of
the law’s plainly legitimate applications.”  Id. at 120.  It is also worth noting
that when, as here, a statute is addressed to conduct rather than speech, an
overbreadth challenge is less likely to succeed.  See id. at 124 (“Rarely, if
ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that
is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated
with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).”).
Hammoud argues that § 2339B is overbroad because (1) it prohibits mere
association with an FTO, and (2) it prohibits such plainly legitimate activities
as teaching members of an FTO how to apply for grants to further the organiza-
tion’s humanitarian aims.  As discussed above, § 2339B does not prohibit
mere association with an FTO and therefore is not overbroad on that basis.
Regarding Hammoud’s second overbreadth argument, it may be true that the
material support prohibition of § 2339B encompasses some forms of expres-
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sion that are entitled to First Amendment protection.  Cf. Humanitarian Law
Project, 205 F.3d at 1138 (holding that “training” prong of material support
definition is vague because it covers such forms of protected expression as
“instruct[ing] members of a designated group on how to petition the United
Nations to give aid to their group”).  Hammoud has utterly failed to demon-
strate, however, that any overbreadth is substantial in relation to the legitimate
reach of § 2339B.  See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122 (“The overbreadth claimant
bears the burden of demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual
fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.” (alteration & internal quotation
marks omitted)).
    C. Vagueness
Hammoud next argues that the term “material support” is unconstitution-
ally vague.  “The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes
define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited
and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”
United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1291 (4th Cir. 1993). In evaluating
whether a statute is vague, a court must consider both whether it provides
notice to the public and whether it adequately curtails arbitrary enforcement.
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58.
Section 2339B easily satisfies this standard.  As noted above, the term
“material support” is specifically defined as a number of enumerated actions.
Hammoud relies on Humanitarian Law Project, in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled that two components of the material support definition—“personnel”
and “training”—were vague.  See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at
1137-38.  The possible vagueness of these prongs of the material support
definition does not affect Hammoud’s conviction, however, because he was
specifically charged with providing material support in the form of currency.
See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(rejecting vagueness challenge because allegedly vague term was not relevant
to Appellant’s conviction).  There is nothing at all vague about the term
“currency.”
 D. Designation of an FTO
Hammoud’s final challenge to the constitutionality of § 2339B concerns
his inability to challenge the designation of Hizballah as an FTO. Section
2339B(g)(6) defines “terrorist organization” as “an organization designated
[by the Secretary of State] as a terrorist organization under [8 U.S.C.A. § 1189
(West 1999 & Supp. 2004) ].”  Section 1189(a)(8) explicitly prohibits a
defendant in a criminal action from challenging a designation. Hammoud
argues that his inability to challenge the designation of Hizballah as an FTO
is a violation of the Constitution.
17Sec. 1-3 LAWS AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT TERRORISM
Hammoud primarily argues that § 1189(a)(8) deprives him of his constitu-
tional right to a jury determination of guilt on every element of the charged
offense.  See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995) (holding
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “require criminal convictions to rest
upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt”).  This right has
not been violated, however.  “[I]n determining what facts must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the . . . legislature’s definition of the elements of
the offense is usually dispositive . . . .” McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 85 (1986).  Here, Congress has provided that the fact of an organization’s
designation as an FTO is an element of § 2339B, but the validity of the
designation is not.  Therefore, Hammoud’s inability to challenge the designa-
tion is not a violation of his constitutional rights. See United States v. Bozarov,
974 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant’s inability to
challenge administrative classification did not violate due process because the
validity of the classification was not an element of the offense).
Hammoud next argues that § 1189(a) violates the nondelegation doctrine
because the designation of an organization as an FTO is not subject to judicial
review.  In the first place, it is not clear whether the nondelegation doctrine
requires any form of judicial review.  Compare Bozarov, 974 F.2d at 1041-45
(rejecting claim that a congressional delegation of authority was unconstitu-
tional because the agency’s action was not subject to judicial review), with
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1991) (rejecting claim that
temporary regulation violated nondelegation doctrine on basis that permanent
regulation was subject to judicial review and temporary regulation could be
challenged in criminal proceedings).  In any event, an FTO designation is
subject to judicial review—the designation may be challenged by the organiza-
tion itself, see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b).
* * *
 IX. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reject each of Hammoud’s challenges
to his convictions and sentence.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court in its entirety.
AFFIRMED
——————————
Notes
1. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision based
on a sentencing issue not addressed in the excerpt above.  See Hammoud v.
United States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).  The Fourth Circuit, on remand, con-
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cluded that “the order of the Supreme Court does not affect our resolution of
Hammoud’s challenges to his convictions.”  United States v. Hammoud, 405
F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
2. Why would Congress generally want to avoid making courts decide who
is a “terrorist” or what is “terrorism”?
3. Is there a practical reason that laws prohibiting the financing of terrorist
organizations ultimately may be more important in preventing terrorism than
laws prohibiting terrorist acts?
4. The Hammoud opinion says that courts may review the designation of
a group as a “foreign terrorist organization” but only if the designated group
itself brings a challenge.  Is it likely that any of the organizations designated
as a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State actually would
challenge its designation?
5. Might 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and cases like Hammoud have the unintended
effect of deterring legitimate charitable donations?  See Nina J. Crimm, High
Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implica-
tions for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations and Global Philan-
thropy,  45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1341, 1395 (2004) (arguing that “[i]t is not
inconceivable that the government could overzealously charge, although not
necessarily indict or convict, even an innocent donor or charitable organiza-
tion with one or more criminal offenses if the government found that dona-
tions ultimately were collected for and/or were funneled to a terrorist or
terrorist organization.” (footnotes omitted)).  How might Congress address
this concern?
1-4. TREASON AND SEDITION
Following World War II, the United States prosecuted a few of its citizens
for treason.  Famous cases involved “Tokyo Rose” (Iva Ikuko D’Aquino) and
“Axis Sally” (Mildred Elizabeth Gillars), who had made propaganda radio
broadcasts for the Japanese and German governments during the War.  See
D’Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United
States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).  Both were convicted and served leng-
thy prison terms.  In recent years, some American citizens or permanent
residents have participated in terrorist acts aimed against the people or the
government of the United States.  The question arises whether their acts also
might constitute either treason or some form of sedition.
 ——————————
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UNITED STATES v. RAHMAN
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999)
PER CURIAM:
INTRODUCTION
These are appeals by ten defendants convicted of seditious conspiracy and
other offenses arising out of a wide-ranging plot to conduct a campaign of
urban terrorism.  Among the activities of some or all of the defendants were
rendering assistance to those who bombed the World Trade Center, see United
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming convictions of all
four defendants), planning to bomb bridges and tunnels in New York City,
murdering Rabbi Meir Kahane, and planning to murder the President of Egypt.
We affirm the convictions of all the defendants.  We also affirm all of the
sentences, with the exception of the sentence of Ibrahim El-Gabrowny, which
we remand for further consideration.
BACKGROUND
* * *
I. The Government’s Case
At trial, the Government sought to prove that the defendants and others
joined in a seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism against the
United States and forcibly to oppose its authority.  The Government also
sought to prove various other counts against the defendants, all of which
broadly relate to the seditious conspiracy.  The Government alleged that
members of the conspiracy (acting alone or in concert) took the following
actions, among others, in furtherance of the group’s objectives:  the attempted
murder of Hosni Mubarak, the provision of assistance to the bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993, and the Spring
1993 campaign of attempted bombings of buildings and tunnels in New York
City. In addition, some members of the group were allegedly involved in the
murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane by defendant Nosair.
The Government adduced evidence at trial showing the following:  Abdel
Rahman, a blind Islamic scholar and cleric, was the leader of the seditious
conspiracy, the purpose of which was “jihad,” in the sense of a struggle
against the enemies of Islam.  Indicative of this purpose, in a speech to his
followers Abdel Rahman instructed that they were to “do jihad with the
sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile . . . against God’s
enemies.”  Govt. Ex. 550 at 22.  Abdel Rahman’s role in the conspiracy was
generally limited to overall supervision and direction of the membership, as
he made efforts to remain a level above the details of individual operations.
However, as a cleric and the group’s leader, Abdel Rahman was entitled to
dispense “fatwas,” religious opinions on the holiness of an act, to members
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of the group sanctioning proposed courses of conduct and advising them
whether the acts would be in furtherance of jihad.
According to his speeches and writings, Abdel Rahman perceives the
United States as the primary oppressor of Muslims worldwide, active in
assisting Israel to gain power in the Middle East, and largely under the control
of the Jewish lobby.  Abdel Rahman also considers the secular Egyptian
government of Mubarak to be an oppressor because it has abided Jewish
migration to Israel while seeking to decrease Muslim births.  Holding these
views, Abdel Rahman believes that jihad against Egypt and the United States
is mandated by the Qur’an.  Formation of a jihad army made up of small
“divisions” and “battalions” to carry out this jihad was therefore necessary,
according to Abdel Rahman, in order to beat back these oppressors of Islam
including the United States.  Tr. 2197.
Although Abdel Rahman did not arrive in the United States until 1990, a
group of his followers began to organize the jihad army in New York begin-
ning in 1989.  At that time, law enforcement had several of the members of
the group under surveillance.  In July 1989, on three successive weekends, FBI
agents observed and photographed members of the jihad organization, includ-
ing (at different times), Nosair, Hampton-El, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Moham-
mad Salameh, and Nidal Ayyad (the latter three of whom were later convicted
of the World Trade Center bombing, see Salameh, 152 F.3d at 161), shooting
weapons, including AK-47’s, at a public rifle range on Long Island.  Although
Abdel Rahman was in Egypt at the time, Nosair and Abouhalima called him
there to discuss various issues including the progress of their military training,
tape-recording these conversations for distribution among Abdel Rahman’s
followers. Nosair told Abdel Rahman “we have organized an encampment,
we are concentrating here.”  Govt. Ex. 851 at 2-3.
On November 5, 1990, Rabbi Meir Kahane, a former member of the Israeli
parliament and a founder of the Jewish Defense League, gave a speech at the
Marriot East Side Hotel in New York. Kahane was a militant Zionist, who
advocated expelling Arabs from Israel.  The content of this speech was a plea
to American Jews to emigrate and settle in Israel.  Nosair and possibly Salam-
eh and Bilal Alkaisi, another member of the group, attended the speech. After
the speech, as Kahane stood talking with the crowd, two shots were fired and
Kahane was hit in the neck and chest.
Nosair, whom witnesses observed with a gun in hand immediately after
the shooting, then ran toward the rear door of the room, trailed by one of the
onlookers.  At the door, 70-year-old Irving Franklin sought to impede Nosair’s
flight.  Nosair shot Franklin in the leg, and fled the room.  Outside the hotel
Nosair encountered uniformed postal police officer Carlos Acosta.  Acosta
tried to draw his weapon and identify himself, but before he could fire, Nosair
fired two shots at him.  The first of these shots hit Acosta in the chest but was
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deflected into his shoulder by a bullet-proof vest he was wearing, and the
second just missed Acosta’s head.  Despite being shot, Acosta returned fire,
hitting Nosair in the neck.  Nosair fell to the ground, dropping his weapon,
a .357 caliber magnum revolver, at his side.  Acosta recovered the weapon and
detained Nosair.  Ballistics testing showed that the weapon recovered from
Nosair was the weapon that fired projectiles found in the room in which
Kahane and Franklin had been shot, as well as in the area Acosta had been
shot.
Subsequent to these events, law enforcement personnel executed search
warrants for Nosair’s home, car, and work lockers.  Among the items seized
in these searches was a handwritten notebook, in which Nosair stated that to
establish a Muslim state in the Muslim holy lands it would be necessary: 
to break and destroy the morale of the enemies of Allah.  (And this is by
means of destroying) (exploding) the structure of their civilized pillars.
Such as the touristic infrastructure which they are proud of and their high
world buildings which they are proud of and their statues which they
endear and the buildings in which they gather their heads (leaders). 
Tr. 3962-63.
[Additional evidence, discussed at length in the court’s opinion, showed
that Rahmen, Nosair, and the other defendants plotted to bomb the United
Nations complex in New York, to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mu-
barak, to attack the FBI headquarters and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels
in New York. Some of them also purchased bomb making components for
carrying out these plots, including fuel, fertilizer, and 55-gallon drums.  The
FBI arrested the men before they could carry out their plans.]
* * *
III. Verdicts and Sentences
The jury trial in the case ran from January 9, 1995, to October 1, 1995.
The jury returned verdicts finding defendants guilty on all submitted charges,
except that Nosair and El-Gabrowny obtained not guilty verdicts on the Count
Five bombing conspiracy charges.  The defendants were sentenced as follows:
Abdel Rahman and Nosair, life imprisonment;  El-Gabrowny, 57 years;
Alvarez, Hampton-El, Elhassan, and Saleh, 35 years;  Amir Abdelgani and
Khallafalla, 30 years;  Fadil Abdelgani, 25 years. . . .
DISCUSSION
 I. Constitutional Challenges
A. Seditious Conspiracy Statute and the Treason Clause
Defendant Nosair (joined by other defendants) contends that his conviction
for seditious conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2384, was illegal because
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it failed to satisfy the requirements of the Treason Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, Art. III, § 3.
Article III, Section 3 provides, in relevant part: 
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.  No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
 The seditious conspiracy statute provides: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down or
to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war
against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to
prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or
by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States con-
trary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2384.
Nosair contends that because the seditious conspiracy statute punishes
conspiracy to “levy war” against the United States without a conforming
two-witness requirement, the statute is unconstitutional.  He further claims
that because his conviction for conspiracy to levy war against the United
States was not based on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act,
the conviction violates constitutional standards.
It is undisputed that Nosair’s conviction was not supported by two wit-
nesses to the same overt act.  Accordingly the conviction must be overturned
if the requirement of the Treason Clause applies to this prosecution for
seditious conspiracy.
The plain answer is that the Treason Clause does not apply to the prosecu-
tion.  The provisions of Article III, Section 3 apply to prosecutions for “trea-
son.”  Nosair and his co-appellants were not charged with treason.  Their
offense of conviction, seditious conspiracy under Section 2384, differs from
treason not only in name and associated stigma, but also in its essential
elements and punishment.
In the late colonial period, as today, the charge of treason carried a
“peculiar intimidation and stigma” with considerable “potentialities . . . as a
political epithet.”  See William Hurst, Treason in the United States (Pt. II),
58 Harv. L. Rev. 395, 424-25 (1945).
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, furthermore, treason was
punishable not only by death, but by an exceptionally cruel method of execu-
tion designed to enhance the suffering of the traitor.  See 4 William Black-
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stone, Commentaries *92 (observing that the punishment for treason is “terri-
ble” in that the traitor is “hanged by the neck, then cut down alive,” that “his
entrails [are then] taken out, and burned, while he is yet alive,” “that his head
[is] cut off,” and that his “body [is then] divided into four parts”).  In contrast,
lesser subversive offenses were penalized by noncapital punishments or less
brutal modes of execution.  See id. at *94-*126.  The Framers may have
intended to limit the applicability of the most severe penalties—or simply the
applicability of capital punishment for alleged subversion—to instances of
levying war against, or adhering to enemies of, the United States.  See Hurst,
supra, at 425 n. 141 (indicating that at least some delegates “regarded the
effort to limit the application of the death penalty for subversive crimes as the
central motive of the restrictive definition of treason”).  Today treason contin-
ues to be punishable by death, while seditious conspiracy commands a maxi-
mum penalty of twenty years imprisonment.
In recognition of the potential for political manipulation of the treason
charge, the Framers may have formulated the Treason Clause as a protection
against promiscuous resort to this particularly stigmatizing label, which carries
such harsh consequences.  It is thus possible to interpret  the Treason Clause
as applying only to charges denominated as “treason.”
The Supreme Court has identified but not resolved the question whether
the clause applies to offenses that include all the elements of treason but are
not branded as such.  Compare Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942) (sug-
gesting, in dictum, that citizens could be tried for an offense against the law
of war that included all the elements of treason), with Cramer v. United States,
325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (noting in dictum that it did not “intimate that Congress
could dispense with [the] two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense
[of treason] another name.”)  The question whether a defendant who engaged
in subversive conduct might be tried for a crime involving all the elements of
treason, but under a different name and without the constitutional protection
of the Treason Clause, therefore remains open.  And we need not decide it in
this case, because the crime of which Nosair was convicted differs signifi-
cantly from treason, not only in name and punishment, but also in definition.
Seditious conspiracy by levying war includes no requirement that the
defendant owe allegiance to the United States, an element necessary to convic-
tion of treason.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (defining “allegiance to United States”
as an element of treason).  Nosair nevertheless maintains that “[t]he only
distinction between the elements of seditious conspiracy under the levy war
prong and treason by levying war is that the former requires proof of a con-
spiracy while the latter requires proof of the substantive crime.” Reply Brief
for Nosair at 9. Noting that the requirement of allegiance appears explicitly
in the treason statute, but not in the Treason Clause, Nosair suggests that
allegiance to the United States is not an element of treason within the contem-
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plation of the Constitution.  He concludes that, for constitutional purposes,
the elements constituting seditious conspiracy by levying war and treason by
levying war are identical, and consequently that prosecutions for seditious
conspiracy by levying war must conform to the requirements of the Treason
Clause.
The argument rests on a false premise.  The Treason Clause does not, as
Nosair supposes, purport to specify the elements of the crime of treason.
Instead, in addition to providing evidentiary safeguards, the Clause restricts
the conduct that may be deemed treason to “levying war” against the United
States and “adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”  It does
not undertake to define the constituent elements of the substantive crime.
Moreover, any acceptable recitation of the elements of treason must
include the breach of allegiance.  The concept of allegiance betrayed is
integral to the term “treason,” and has been since well before the drafting of
the Constitution.  See 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 287 (noting that
“the idea of treachery” has been part of the treason offense since the reign of
Edward III).  In both “its common-law and constitutional definitions the term
‘treason’ imports a breach of allegiance.”  Green’s Case, 8 Ct.Cl. 412, 1872
WL 5731 (1872).  Treason “imports a betraying.”  Id. (quoting 3 Tomlin’s Law
Dictionary 637).  Blackstone, too, noted that treason, “in it’s [sic ] very name
. . . imports a betraying, treachery or breach of faith.”  4 Blackstone, supra,
at *75.  Early on, our Supreme Court recognized that “[t]reason is a breach
of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance.”
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.).
Nor is there any doubt that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
“used [the term ‘treason’] to express the central concept of betrayal of alle-
giance.”  Hurst, supra, at 415.
Nosair’s suggestion that the statutory definition of treason added the
requirement of allegiance is mistaken.  The reference to treason in the consti-
tutional clause necessarily incorporates the elements of allegiance and betrayal
that are essential to the concept of treason.  Cf. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 97
(noting that the inclusion of the words “owing allegiance” in a statute punish-
ing treason are surplusage because the concept is implicit in the term).  The
functions of the Clause are to limit the crime of treason to betrayals of alle-
giance that are substantial, amounting to levying war or giving comfort to
enemies, and to require sufficiently reliable evidence. Treason, in other words,
may not be found on the basis of mere mutterings of discontent, or relatively
innocuous opposition.  The fact that the Treason Clause imposes its require-
ments without mentioning the requirement of allegiance is not a basis for
concluding that treason may be prosecuted without allegiance being proved.
That any conviction for treason under the laws of the United States requires
a betrayal of allegiance is simply implicit in the term “treason.”  Nosair was
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thus tried for a different, and lesser, offense than treason.  We therefore see
no reasonable basis to maintain that the requirements of the Treason Clause
should apply to Nosair’s prosecution.  Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 803
F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that “oppose by force”
prong of Section 2384 conflicts with Treason Clause).
B. Seditious Conspiracy Statute and the First Amendment
Abdel Rahman, joined by the other appellants, contends that the seditious
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2384, is an unconstitutional burden on free
speech and the free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment.
First, Abdel Rahman argues that the statute is facially invalid because it
criminalizes protected expression and that it is overbroad and unconstitution-
ally vague.  Second, Abdel Rahman contends that his conviction violated the
First Amendment because it rested solely on his political views and religious
practices.
1. Facial Challenge
 a. Restraint on Speech.  Section 2384 provides: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or
destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war
against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to
prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or
by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States con-
trary to the authority thereof, they shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than twenty years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2384.
As Section 2384 proscribes “speech” only when it constitutes an agreement
to use force against the United States, Abdel Rahman’s generalized First
Amendment challenge to the statute is without merit.  Our court has previously
considered and rejected a First Amendment challenge to Section 2384.  See
United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955). Although Lebron’s
analysis of the First Amendment issues posed by Section 2384 was brief, the
panel found the question was squarely controlled by the Supreme Court’s
then-recent decision in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  In
Dennis, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act, which made
it a crime to advocate, or to conspire to advocate, the overthrow of the United
States government by force or violence.  See 18 U.S.C.  § 2385;  Dennis, 341
U.S. at 494.  The Dennis Court concluded that, while the “element of speech”
inherent in Smith Act convictions required that the Act be given close First
Amendment scrutiny, the Act did not impermissibly burden the expression of
protected speech, as it was properly “directed at advocacy [of overthrow of
the government by force], not discussion.”  See id. at 502.
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After Dennis, the Court broadened the scope of First Amendment restric-
tions on laws that criminalize subversive advocacy.  It remains fundamental
that while the state may not criminalize the expression of views—even includ-
ing the view that violent overthrow of the government is desirable—it may
nonetheless outlaw encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy to take violent
action.  Thus, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318(1957), overruled
in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 7 (1978), the
Court interpreted the Smith Act to prohibit only the advocacy of concrete
violent action, but not “advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an
abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end.”
And in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam), the
Court held that a state may proscribe subversive advocacy only when such
advocacy is directed towards, and is likely to result in, “imminent lawless
action.”
The prohibitions of the seditious conspiracy statute are much further
removed from the realm of constitutionally protected speech than those at
issue in Dennis and its progeny.  To be convicted under Section 2384, one
must conspire to use force, not just to advocate the use of force.  We have no
doubt that this passes the test of constitutionality.
Our view of Section 2384’s constitutionality also finds support in a number
of the Supreme Court’s more recent First Amendment decisions.  These cases
make clear that a line exists between expressions of belief, which are protected
by the First Amendment, and threatened or actual uses of force, which are not.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (“A physical assault is
not . . . expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment”);  R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First
Amendment”);  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)
(“The First Amendment does not protect violence”);  Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (Congress may outlaw threats against President,
provided that “[w]hat is a threat [is] distinguished from what is constitution-
ally protected speech.”);  see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 588 (4th
Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act, as Act prohibits only use of force, physical obstruction, or threats
of force);  Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418-20 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same);
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
b. Vagueness and Overbreadth.  Abdel Rahman also contends that Section
2384 is overbroad and void for vagueness.  See Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982).
(i) Overbreadth. A law is overbroad, and hence void, if it “does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control, but, on the
contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that . . . constitute an exercise
of freedom of speech or of the press.”  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97
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(1940).  Particularly when conduct and not speech is involved, to void the
statute the overbreadth must be “real [and] substantial . . . judged in relation
to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 613 (1973);  see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799-800 & 800 n. 19 (1984).
We recognize that laws targeting “sedition” must be scrutinized with care
to assure that the threat of prosecution will not deter expression of unpopular
viewpoints by persons ideologically opposed to the government.  But Section
2384 is drawn sufficiently narrowly that we perceive no unacceptable risk of
such abuse.
Abdel Rahman argues that Section 2384 is overbroad because Congress
could have achieved its public safety aims “without chilling First Amendment
rights” by punishing only “substantive acts involving bombs, weapons, or
other violent acts.”  Abdel Rahman Br. at 67.  One of the beneficial purposes
of the conspiracy law is to permit arrest and prosecution before the substantive
crime has been accomplished.  The Government, possessed of evidence of
conspiratorial planning, need not wait until buildings and tunnels have been
bombed and people killed before arresting the conspirators.  Accordingly, it
is well established that the Government may criminalize certain preparatory
steps towards criminal action, even when the crime consists of the use of
conspiratorial or exhortatory words.  See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d
670, 678 (6th Cir. 1985).  Because Section 2384 prohibits only conspiratorial
agreement, we are satisfied that the statute is not constitutionally overbroad.
(ii) Vagueness.  Abdel Rahman also challenges the statute for vagueness.
A criminal statute, particularly one regulating speech, must “define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can under-
stand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 357, (1983);  see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.  Abdel Rahman
argues that Section 2384 does not provide “fair warning” about what acts are
unlawful, leaving constitutionally protected speech vulnerable to criminal
prosecution.
There is indeed authority suggesting that the word “seditious” does not
sufficiently convey what conduct it forbids to serve as an essential element
of a crime.  See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967)
(noting that “dangers fatal to First Amendment freedoms inhere in the word
‘seditious,’” and invalidating law that provided, inter alia, that state employ-
ees who utter “seditious words” may be discharged).  But the word “seditious”
does not appear in the prohibitory text of the statute;  it appears only in the
caption.  The terms of the statute are far more precise.  The portions charged
against Abdel Rahman and his co-defendants—conspiracy to levy war against
the United States and to oppose by force the authority thereof—do not involve
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terms of such vague meaning. Furthermore, they unquestionably specify that
agreement to use force is an essential element of the crime.  Abdel Rahman
therefore cannot prevail on the claim that the portions of Section 2384 charged
against him criminalize mere expressions of opinion, or are unduly vague.
2. Application of Section 2384 to Abdel Rahman’s Case
Abdel Rahman also argues that he was convicted not for entering into any
conspiratorial agreement that Congress may properly forbid, but “solely for
his religious words and deeds” which, he contends, are protected by the First
Amendment.  In support of this claim, Abdel Rahman cites the Government’s
use in evidence of his speeches and writings.
There are two answers to Abdel Rahman’s contention.  The first is that
freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution
of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes.
Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed
by speech alone.  As examples:  Section 2 makes it an offense to “counsel[],”
“command[],” “induce[]” or “procure[]” the commission of an offense against
the United States.  18 U.S.C. § 2(a).  Section 371 makes it a crime to “conspire
. . . to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Section 373, with which Abdel Rahman was charged, makes it a crime to
“solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade” another
person to commit a crime of violence.  18 U.S.C. § 373(a).  Various other
statutes, like Section 2384, criminalize conspiracies of specified objectives,
see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(d) (conspiracy to kidnap);  18 U.S.C. § 1951
(conspiracy to interfere with commerce through robbery, extortion, or vio-
lence);  21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to violate drug laws).  All of these
offenses are characteristically committed through speech.  Notwithstanding
that political speech and religious exercise are among the activities most
jealously guarded by the First Amendment, one is not immunized from prose-
cution for such speech-based offenses merely because one commits them
through the medium of political speech or religious preaching.  Of course,
courts must be vigilant to insure that prosecutions are not improperly based
on the mere expression of unpopular ideas.  But if the evidence shows that the
speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal
activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.  See
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1969).
The evidence justifying Abdel Rahman’s conviction for conspiracy and
solicitation showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he crossed this line.  His
speeches were not simply the expression of ideas;  in some instances they
constituted the crime of conspiracy to wage war on the United States under
Section 2384 and solicitation of attack on the United States military installa-
tions, as well as of the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak under
Section 373.
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For example:
Abdel Rahman told Salem he “should make up with God . . . by turning
his rifle’s barrel to President Mubarak’s chest, and kill[ing] him.”  Tr. 4633.
On another occasion, speaking to Abdo Mohammed Haggag about murder-
ing President Mubarak during his visit to the United States, Abdel Rahman
told Haggag, “Depend on God. Carry out this operation.  It does not require
a fatwa . . . You are ready in training, but do it.  Go ahead.”  Tr. 10108.
The evidence further showed that Siddig Ali consulted with Abdel Rahman
about the bombing of the United Nations Headquarters, and Abdel Rahman
told him, “Yes, it’s a must, it’s a duty.”  Tr. 5527-29.
On another occasion, when Abdel Rahman was asked by Salem about
bombing the United Nations, he counseled against it on the ground that it
would be “bad for Muslims,” Tr. 6029, but added that Salem should “find a
plan to destroy or to bomb or to . . . inflict damage to the American Army.”
Tr. 6029-30.
Words of this nature—ones that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to
commit crimes of violence—violate the law and may be properly prosecuted
regardless of whether they are uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in
administering the duties of a religious ministry.  The fact that his speech or
conduct was “religious” does not immunize him from prosecution under
generally-applicable criminal statutes. . . .
Abdel Rahman also protests the Government’s use in evidence of his
speeches, writings, and preachings that did not in themselves constitute the
crimes of solicitation or conspiracy.  He is correct that the Government placed
in evidence many instances of Abdel Rahman’s writings and speeches in
which Abdel Rahman expressed his opinions within the protection of the First
Amendment.  However, while the First Amendment fully protects Abdel
Rahman’s right to express hostility against the United States, and he may not
be prosecuted for so speaking, it does not prevent the use of such speeches or
writings in evidence when relevant to prove a pertinent fact in a criminal
prosecution.  The Government was free to demonstrate Abdel Rahman’s
resentment and hostility toward the United States in order to show his motive
for soliciting and procuring illegal attacks against the United States and
against President Mubarak of Egypt.  See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (“The First
Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish
the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”);  United States v.
Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence of religious affilia-
tion relevant to show defendant’s motive to threaten President, because
defendant leader of religious group was imprisoned by Government at time
of threats).
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Furthermore, Judge Mukasey properly protected against the danger that
Abdel Rahman might be convicted because of his unpopular religious beliefs
that were hostile to the United States.  He explained to the jury the limited use
it was entitled to make of the material received as evidence of motive.  He
instructed that a defendant could not be convicted on the basis of his beliefs
or the expression of them—even if those beliefs favored violence.  He prop-
erly instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty only if the evi-
dence proved he committed a crime charged in the indictment.
We reject Abdel Rahman’s claim that his conviction violated his rights
under the First Amendment.
*  *  * 
[The court’s discussion of numerous other issues in the case is omitted.]
We have considered all of the other claims raised on appeal by all of the
defendants, beyond those discussed in this opinion, and conclude that they are
without merit.  The convictions of all ten defendants are affirmed.  With the
exception of the sentence of defendant El-Gabrowny, which is remanded for
further proceedings as set forth in this opinion, the sentences of all the other
defendants are affirmed.
——————————
Note
In 2001, when the United States went to war in Afghanistan, it fought
against the forces of the Taliban, a group of mostly young Islamists who had
taken over much of the country.  During the fighting, the United States cap-
tured an American citizen named John Walker Lindh who was a foot soldier
for the Taliban.  See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va.
2002).  Lindh ultimately pleaded guilty to breaching a federal regulation
against providing aid to the Taliban, 31 C.F.R. § 545.204, and thus violating
50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), and to an explosives offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h)(2).  He received a prison sentence of 20 years.  (More about his case
appears on page 506 below.)  If the government had charged Lindh with
treason or seditious conspiracy, what would it have had to prove?  Why might
the government have decided not to charge Lindh with those offenses?
